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I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a premises liability case. The issue is whether Respondents ( collectively "Wal-Mart") can 
be held liable for injuries that Appellant Michael Johnson sustained as a result of a slip and fall on liquid 
in the housewares department at Wal-Mart Store 2508 on June 30, 2015. Under well-established Idaho 
law, Wal-Mart cannot be held liable absent notice of a dangerous condition. The record contains no 
evidence of actual notice. As a result, Mr. Johnson points to Wal-Mart's policies and procedures to try to 
establish constructive notice. However, the policies and procedures establish only that Wal-Mart knew 
that spills can occur. Knowledge that a spill can occur is not knowledge that a spill has occurred or is 
likely to occur in a particular area and therefore does not support a finding of constructive notice. If a 
possibility of a spill occurring were sufficient basis to impose a duty of care, retail stores would become 
insurers of customer safety, and the legal standard would convert to strict liability. The law is clear that 
retail stores are not insurers and are not strictly liable. Because Wal-Mart is not an insurer of safety and 
because Wal-Mart had no notice of liquid on the floor, Wal-Mart had no duty to Mr. Johnson and cannot 
be held liable for damages. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Wal-Mart filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss 
Mr. Johnson's claim for lack of evidence that Wal-Mart had actual or constructive notice of the liquid on 
the floor. R. 000019-34. Mr. Johnson opposed the motion, arguing that Wal-Mart had constructive 
notice of a spill hazard, an allegedly recurring condition, because it trained employees of a risk and 
because it had a permissive policy of allowing customers to bring liquid into the store. R. 000084-86; Tr. 
19:23 20:13, 21:6-19. 
The district court granted Wal-Mart's motion, finding no evidence that the liquid on the floor was 
a recurring condition and finding no basis to impute knowledge of the liquid on the floor to Wal-Mart. 
R. 000190-192. In its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, the district court explained, "the reality that people sometimes slip on spilled liquid ... isn't 
reason enough to deem the spill on which Johnson slipped a recurring or continuing condition." 
R. 000190. As to the specific liquid on the floor, the district court applied the scintilla test and found that 
to impute knowledge, "something more" was needed than the mere presence of liquid on the floor. 
R. 000192. It then found the "something more" to be lacking, concluding that there needed to be some 
evidence as to how long the liquid had been on the floor. R. 000192. Additionally, the district court 
declined to "impute knowledge of the spill to Walmart simply because it lets customers carry beverages 
about the store." R. 000191. 
Mr. Johnson timely appealed. R. 000196. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Mr. Johnson Slipped and Fell on a Liquid Substance in Wal-Mart's Overland Store. 
On June 30, 2015, in the middle of the afternoon on a warm sunny day, Mr. Johnson and his 
girlfriend went to the Overland store to buy motorcycle straps. R. 000037 (, 2), 000042 (95:21-24), 
000044 (99: 18-24). Mr. Johnson and his girlfriend entered the Overland store on the grocery side and 
made their way over to the general merchandise side. R. 000037 (, 2), 000043-47 (96:21-23, 99:9-10, 
100:2-6, 101:23 -102:6); R. 000071 (,12), 000074. While walking through the housewares department, 
in an aisle with trash cans on the shelves, Mr. Johnson slipped on a liquid substance and fell. R. 000037 
(, 2), 000047 (102:7-16), 000054 (114:13-18). 
The only eyewitness to the fall was Mr. Johnson's girlfriend. See R. 000037 (, 2), 000047-48 
(102:17 - 103:7). There were no employees in the aisle at the time of the fall. See id. Also, Wal-Mart 
does not have surveillance video of the incident because the Overland store did not have a camera taking 
surveillance video of the aisle in the housewares department where Mr. Johnson fell. R. 000067 (, 12). 
There was a camera taking surveillance video of an "action alley" (i.e., a main aisle) perpendicular to the 
aisle where Mr. Johnson fell. R. 000066 (, 10). Video from that camera shows Mr. Johnson enter the 
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action alley on the ground at approximately 3: 13 p.m. R. 000066 (ilil 10-11 ); R. 000063. In other words, 
it shows him after he has fallen on the floor. 
B. The Source of the Liquid and How Long It Was on the Floor Are Unknown. 
Mr. Johnson does not know what the liquid substance was, where it came from, or how long it 
had been on the floor. R. 000037 (il 2), 000049-51 (104:19-22, 108:13 -109:4-16). Likewise, 
Mr. Johnson's girlfriend does not know what the liquid substance was, where it came from, or how long it 
had been on the floor. R. 000037 (il 4), 000060 (34:3-8). Finally, Mr. Johnson did not come forward 
with evidence that Wal-Mart knew what the liquid substance was, where it came from, or how long it had 
been on the floor of the Overland store. 
The surveillance video of the action alley perpendicular to where Mr. Johnson fell shows 
approximately 14 customers, some with shopping carts, either enter or exit the housewares department 
aisle from the action alley in the 30 minutes before Mr. Johnson's fall. R. 000066 (il 11); R. 000037 
(ilil 5-6), R. 000063. The video does not show activity in the aisle where Mr. Johnson fell. See R. 000067 
(il 12), R. 000063. Also, it does not show how or when the liquid ended up on the floor. See R. 000067 
(il 12), R. 000063. 
C. Wal-Mart's Overland Store Does Not Have a History of Liquid on the Floor or 
Other Incidents in the Area Where Mr. Johnson Fell. 
The Overland store does not have a record of anyone reporting liquid on the floor in the aisle 
where Mr. Johnson fell prior to the slip and fall on June 30, 2015. R. 000071(,r 8). Additionally, the 
Overland store does not have record of liquid previously being on the floor in this aisle at any time. 
R. 000071 ,r,r 9-10. Finally, there is no record of other accidents, including slip and falls, reportedly 
taking place in this aisle before Mr. Johnson's slip and fall on June 30, 2015. R. 000071 (il 7). In other 
words, Mr. Johnson's fall in this area was the first of its kind. 
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D. Wal-Mart Has Procedures in Place to Keep Store Premises Reasonably Free from 
Possible Spills. 
Wal-Mart recognizes that spills can cause accidents and has implemented procedures to reduce 
the possibility of accidents from spills. See ROOO 116-17 (30:24 - 32:4); R. 000166. One procedure is 
called "Spill Cleanup Procedure." See R000166-l 74. This procedure encourages employees to place "a 
strong emphasis on prompt cleanup of spills." See ROOO 166. It also identifies specific actions associates 
should take to promptly cleanup spills. See R000167-l 74. Nothing in the procedure identifies how often 
spills or accidents occur. 
In order to keep the floors reasonably free from spills, Wal-Mart has a culture in which associates 
keep a constant look-out for spills and promptly clean-up spills. R. 000116-17 (30:24- 31 :22). Wal-
Mart also employs associates to focus on maintaining the floors in the action alleys (high-traffic aisles) 
• 1 
durmgpeakhours. R. 000117-18 (33:3-15, 36:15-25, 38:1-39:11). 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Wal-Mart. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard as the 
district court. Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 543, 328 P.3d 520, 524 (2014). Summary 
judgment is proper under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) if the moving party shows that 
there is an absence of material facts with respect to a claim and the nonmoving party fails to 
show specific facts that would support the claim at trial. Id. The nonmoving party must "make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which 
1 
Mr. Johnson represents that certain associates have the job of walking the action alleys solely to 
look for spills. Appellant's Brief at 15. That is not accurate. The job is broader than looking for spills, it 
is to maintain the floors. R. 000117-18 (33 :3-15, 36: 15-25, 38: 1 - 39: 11 ). 
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that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 
527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 
(1986); Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)). "[A] mere scintilla of 
evidence or merely casting a slight doubt over the facts will not defeat summary judgment." 
Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 593, 272 P.3d 562, 565 (2012). "[T]here must be evidence upon 
which a jury may rely." Id. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Respondents. 
Mr. Johnson did not present admissible evidence to support a finding that Wal-Mart had notice 
of a dangerous condition. In the absence of notice, Wal-Mart did not breach a duty owed to 
Mr. Johnson. The law does not impose a duty on Wal-Mart to keep liquids out of the store or to 
give a general warning of a possibility of liquid on the floor. Additionally, the law has never 
required retail stores to be held strictly liable for accidents on the premises. 
A. Wal-Mart Did Not Have Constructive Notice of a Dangerous Condition Giving Rise 
to a Duty. 
For the purpose of a premises liability claim, an injured invitee must prove: "(1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring a [retail store] to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting 
injuries; and ( 4) actual loss or damage." Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528.
2 
There are 
two kinds of duties a retail store may owe to an invitee: (a) a duty "to warn of any concealed 
dangers which the landowner knows of or should have known of upon reasonable investigation 
2 
The parties agree that Mr. Johnson was an invitee of Wal-Mart. 
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of the land," and (b) a duty "to keep the premises reasonably safe," i.e., free from dangerous 
conditions. Stem, 152 Idaho at 594, 272 P .3d at 566. The duty owed by a retail store is one of 
ordinary care, not a heightened or special duty. Tommerup v. Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 3, 
607 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 
768 P.2d 1321 (1989). "The owner of the business is not an insurer against injury of its 
customers." Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443, 445, 337 P.3d 602, 604 (2014) 
( emphasis added). 
To prove the existence of a duty, an invitee must "show that the landowner knew, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the alleged dangerous condition," i.e., 
"actual or constructive notice." Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. This is true regardless. 
of whether the dangerous condition is an isolated incident or a recurring condition actively 
created by an operating method. Id. at 548-49, 328 P.3d at 528-29. 
Evidence sufficient to support a finding of notice is different for a case involving an 
isolated incident than for a case involving a recurring or continuous condition actively created by 
an operating method. In an isolated incident case, there must be actual or constructive notice of 
the "specific condition" causing the alleged injury. Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. In 
a recurring condition case, there must be actual or constructive notice that "operating methods 
caused or were likely to cause a dangerous condition." Id. Under either theory, proof of notice 
is never excused because it is notice, combined with a failure to act, that leads to negligence. 
In this case, Mr. Johnson argues that Wal-Mart's business practices created a recurring or 
continuous risk of liquid on the floor. The district court correctly found that this is an isolated 
incident case for which Mr. Johnson has no evidence of notice of the specific liquid. 
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1. There is no evidence of a recurring or continuous condition where 
Mr. Johnson fell, let alone that Wal-Mart knew or should have known of 
such a condition. 
An operating method does not provide a potential basis for liability unless there is 
evidence that a landowner has a habit of actively creating a foreseeably unsafe condition or 
allowing an unsafe condition to continuously develop or exist over a period of time. See Shea, 
156 Idaho at 549-51, 328 P.3d at 529-31; Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677-78, 273 
P.3d 1266, 1270-71 (2012); All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 109 Idaho 479,481, 708 P.2d 884,886 
(1985); McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305, 308, 707 P.2d 416, 419 (1985); Mann 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974). In these cases, the dangerous 
condition is not a singular and unexpected event. Rather, it is something that is recurring or 
continuous or is reasonably likely to be recurring over a period of time. 
For example, in Shea, there was evidence that a car wash operator's method of business 
resulted in ice generally forming on cold days when vehicles track water out of the car wash. 
156 Idaho at 550-51, 328 P Jd at 530-31. Additionally, there was evidence that the car wash 
operator had "knowledge of the 'continuous formation' of ice buildup at the car wash exit at 
certain times during the winter months." Id. at 551,328 P.3d at 531 (emphasis added). This 
evidence was found sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement in a negligent action. Id. 
Thus, the invitee who slipped on ice at the car wash exit was allowed to proceed with a premises 
liability claim. Id. 
In Ball, there was evidence that the City of Blackfoot had a "habit of plowing parking lot 
snow onto the grass beside the sidewalk" in a municipal swimming pool parking lot. Id. at 678, 
273 P.3d at 1271 (emphasis added). This operating method "caused excess snow melt to run 
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onto the sidewalk where it subsequently froze, creating especially icy sidewalk conditions." Id. 
A patron advised the pool manager of the icy conditions but did not see subsequent application 
of ice melt before a slip and fall by another patron. Id. This Court found the evidence sufficient 
to create an issue of fact as to whether the city breached a duty to maintain the sidewalk in a 
reasonably safe condition. Id. at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270. 
In All, there was evidence that a parking lot owner's operating methods had allowed 
"continuous formation" of potholes. 109 Idaho at 482, 708 P .2d at 887 ( emphasis added). 
There was also evidence that the parking lot owner was aware of the deteriorating condition of 
the parking lot and had been filling in holes with gravel until the lot could be repaved. Id. at 480, 
708 P.2d at 885. Because the potholes had formed over a period of time, this Court found the 
evidence sufficient to withstand defendants' motion for directed verdict, concluding that the 
invitee did not need to prove constructive knowledge of the specific pothole causing the fall. Id. 
at 482, 708 P.2d at 887. 
In McDonald, there was evidence that a store handed out ice cream cones to customers, 
including children and infants, on a busy day with abnormally large crowds. 109 Idaho at 307, 
707 P.2d at 418. Ice cream ended up on the floor, and after it had melted, an invitee slipped and 
fell. Id. at 306, 707 P.2d at 417. This Court concluded the melted ice cream was not an isolated 
incident but was instead a foreseeable risk of harm "actively created'' in the store's course of 
business of handing out ice cream cones to kids, who consumed them there on the premises. Id. 
at 308, 707 P.2d at 419 (emphasis added). Additionally, because there was evidence that it takes 
"an hour or two" for ice cream to fully melt, thereby indicating that the melted ice cream had 
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been on the floor for a substantial period of time, this Court concluded that a jury could find that 
the store had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Id. at 310, 707 P.2d at 421. 
In reaching its decision in McDonald, this Court looked to a case from Colorado for 
guidance, Jasko v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 494 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1972). The Colorado Supreme 
Court concluded that pizza on the ground was not an isolated incident where the food came from 
a company's method of selling individual slices of pizza, delivered on wax paper, for customers 
to consume immediately while standing. Jasko, 494 P.2d at 840. The practice of distributing 
food in that manner was held to create a "reasonable probability" that food would drop to the 
floor, as further evidenced by porters "constantly" sweeping up debris from the floor. Id. 
(emphasis added). Just as pizza being sold for immediate consumption actively created a risk of 
food on the ground, so too ice cream being handed out for immediate consumption actively 
created a risk of food on the ground, on a likely recurring basis. McDonald, l 09 Idaho at 308, 
707 P.2d at 419. 
This case is distinguishable from each of the above cases. First, there is no evidence of 
an operating method causing a continuous formation of liquid on t~e floor. Second, there is no 
evidence of an operating method causing a recurring or likely to be a recurring condition of 
liquid on the floor in the area where Mr. Johnson fell. 
Mr. Johnson first argues that this is an operating methods case because of language in 
Wal-Mart's "Spill Cleanup Procedure." The language he relies upon states a simple fact: "Spills 
are largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents in the store." See ROOOl 66. Contrary to 
Mr. Johnson's assertions, the language does not state that spills are a big problem, and it does not 
constitute a warning to employees of a problem. Additionally, nothing in this statement 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF- 9 
44892.0013.10620591.1 
establishes a recurring or continuous problem of liquid in the housewares department or in the 
store as a whole, let alone an operating method causing a recurring or continuous problem. The 
procedure simply trains employees to promptly clean-up spills if they occur. This training is 
evidence of Wal-Mart's compliance with the standard of care, not a breach of the standard of 
care. 
Next, Mr. Johnson argues that this is an operating methods case because Wal-Mart has a 
business practice of allowing customers to bring personal liquids into the store from the outside. 
However, there is no evidence that this permissive policy caused the specific liquid to be on the 
floor let alone a recurring incident of liquid on the floor. The source of the liquid is unknown. 
Assuming arguendo that the liquid could be traced to a customer who brought it into the store, 
such a fact would not put this case into the operating method cases. Unlike McDonald and 
Jasko, Wal-Mart was not actively creating a foreseeable hazard by handing out liquid or food in 
open containers. Unlike Shea and Ball, Wal-Mart did not have an operating method that caused 
the build-up ofliquid on the floor in the housewares department. Unlike All, Wal-Mart did not 
allow a condition to develop in the store over a period of time. 
There simply is no admissible record evidence to support a finding that there was a 
recurring or continual problem of liquid on the floor created by an operating method. Nor is 
there evidence to establish that Wal-Mart's operations caused or otherwise resulted in liquid on 
the floor. Rather, the uncontested evidence in the record shows that Mr. Johnson fell in a dry-
goods houseware aisle where Wal-Mart had no history of other incidents of liquid on the floor. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's finding that this case involves an 
isolated incident, not a recurring or continuous condition caused by an operating method. 
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2. There is no evidence that Wal-Mart knew or had reason to know of the 
specific condition of the floor where Mr. Johnson fell. 
In an isolated incident case, an injured invitee bears the burden of proving actual or 
constructive notice of the specific condition causing injury. Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 
528. To prove constructive notice, there must be evidence establishing a reason that a retail store 
should have known about the specific dangerous condition. See Antim v. Fred Meyers Stores, 
Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 781, 251 P.3d 602, 609 (Ct. App. 2011) (affirming summary judgment for 
defendant because the plaintiffs contention as to how long the mat had been folded was "based 
on pure speculation"); Hansen v. City of Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700, 704, 184 P.3d 206,210 
(2008) ( affirming summary judgment for defendant where the plaintiff could not "point to any 
evidence indicating that one explanation is more plausible than the other" or "remov[ing] this 
issue from the realm of speculation" as to when a water meter lid became askew); Giles v. 
Montgomery Ward, Co., 94 Idaho 484,485,491 P.2d 1256, 1257 (1971) (finding insufficient 
evidence to establish negligence based on a suggestion that a floor was slippery). 
Mr. Johnson presented no record admissible evidence to the Court as to what the liquid 
substance was, where the liquid came from, or how long it had been on the floor. Although 
Mr. Johnson mentions numerous possibilities as to the source of the liquid, he identifies no 
possibility that is beyond the realm of speculation. 
The possibility of a liquid from an unknown source being spilled on the floor of an aisle 
in the housewares department at some unknown time is not evidence that Wal-Mart had reason 
to know of the specific liquid on the floor when Mr. Johnson fell. Although there may have been 
Wal-Mart associates in nearby aisles, there is no evidence that the associates had time or reason 
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to discover the liquid on the floor. Moreover, these witnesses' testimony is not before this Court, 
which only leads to further speculation. 
In the absence of evidence as to the liquid's source and the duration of time that it was on 
the floor, there is no basis to impute knowledge of the liquid to Wal-Mart, leaving Mr. Johnson 
without evidence to support his claim for relief. Accordingly, Wal-Mart asks this Court to affirm 
the district court's decision, granting Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Wal-Mart Did Not Fail to Exercise Reasonable Care for Safety. 
Mr. Johnson claims that Wal-Mart breached a duty to reasonably maintain the premises 
by allowing liquids in the store and by not giving a general warning of a possibility of liquid on 
the floor. These claims are not supported by law or fact. 
1. There is no evidence that Wal-Mart breached a duty of care by allowing 
customers to bring liquids on the premises. 
A business policy allowing customers to bring something on the property only gives rise 
to liability if it creates an "unreasonable risk of harm." Braese, 157 Idaho at 445, 337 P.3d at 
604. In Braese, a policy by Stinker Stores allowing customers to bring dogs into its Hyde Park 
store was not a basis for liability because there was no evidence that the policy created an 
unreasonable risk of harm. Id. The policy was challenged when a patron was hit in the chest by 
the paws of a dog belonging to another patron. Id. The patron filed a common law negligence 
claim against Stinker Stores, but the district court dismissed the claim on summary judgment. Id. 
This Court affirmed the dismissal, noting that there had only been one other incident with a dog 
in 15 years, and it was not a similar incident. Id. Additionally, the evidence showed that 
although the store had millions of customers, it made an effort to keep uncontrollable dogs out of 
the store. Id. There was no evidence that the dog at issue was uncontrollable. Id. 
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Here, there is no record evidence that Wal-Mart created an unreasonable risk of harm by 
allowing customers to bring liquids into the store. There is no evidence as to how many 
customers actually bring liquids in the store. Nor is there evidence as to whether customers spill 
liquids that they bring in from outside. In the absence of such evidence, Mr. Johnson cannot 
establish a likelihood of liquid on the floor from a liquid that is brought into the store by 
customers. 
Additionally, there is no evidence linking the liquid on the floor to Wal-Mart's 
permissive policy of allowing customers to bring liquids in the store. The source of the liquid 
that caused Mr. Johnson's fall is unknown. Mr. Johnson is merely speculating as to a possible 
source of liquid. 
Because Mr. Johnson cannot establish that Wal-Mart's policy created an unreasonable 
risk or resulted in liquid on which he slipped, Wal-Mart's policy does not provide a basis for a 
premises liability claim. 
2. There is no rule of law requiring Wal-Mart to give a general warning, non-
specific to an existing dangerous condition. 
Nothing in the law requires a retail store to warn of a possibility of liquid on the floor. 
Rather, a duty to warn arises where there is actual or constructive notice of liquid on the floor. 
Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. Because there is no admissible record evidence that 
Wal-Mart had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, as explained above in 
section VI.A, Wal-Mart did not have a duty to warn. 
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C. Wal-Mart Is Not Strictly Liable for Injuries that Occur on Its Premises. 
Mr. Johnson is in essence asking this Court to find that Wal-Mart can be held liable based 
on a possibility, not a probability, ofliquid on the floor of the houseware department. Such a 
holding would result in strict liability. 
A retailer is not an insurer of safety and is not strictly liable simply because there is a 
possibility a dangerous condition may appear on the store premises. See Tommerup v. 
Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 3,607 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980),.overruled on other grounds by 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P .2d 1321 (1989). Additionally, a retailer is not required 
to have knowledge of all possible dangerous conditions. See Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 594, 
272 P.3d 562, 566 (2012) (finding no evidence that a landlord should have known a water meter 
cover could be dangerous where the landlord did not have "any knowledge of the weight bearing 
capacity of the water meter covers, or any training or experience that would give him such 
knowledge"). "The true ground of liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge of the 
perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to [a] person going upon the property." 
,Tommerup, 101 Idaho at 3-4, 607 P.2d at 1057-58 (quoting Martin v. Brown, 56 Idaho 379, 382, 
54 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1936)) (emphasis added). 
As explained above, Mr. Johnson bears the burden of proving notice of an actual 
dangerous condition, not a possibility of a dangerous condition. In the absence of such evidence, 
Mr. Johnson does not have a claim for relief against Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is not strictly liable 
for Mr. Johnson's alleged injuries. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart be affirmed. 
DATED THIS 9th day of March, 2018. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
/ 
By~---'--~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Mindy Iler, ISB No. 7983 
Attorneys Wal-Mart Defendants/Respondents 
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